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     ABSTRACT 
 
ARE US GOVERNMENT FOREIGN AID FLOWS AND FDI FLOWS 
INTERTEMPORALLY RELATED? AN INVESTIGATION OF TWENTY-THREE 
COUNTRIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
RAVI PANCHAGNULA  
 2021 
 
In this thesis, I test my central hypothesis that United States government foreign aid flows 
and FDI flows from anywhere in the world to Sub-Saharan Africa are intertemporally 
related; thus, I test to what extent FDI flows follow—and, thus, are caused by—aid flows 
or to what extent aid flows follow—and, thus, are caused by—FDI flows. My panel dataset 
includes twenty-three Sub-Saharan countries and spans 1991 to 2018. Based on the results 
of pooled-OLS and panel fixed-effects regressions, and panel Granger causality tests, I 
show that aid and FDI are intertemporally related. Additionally, Granger-causality is 
bidirectional: FDI Granger-causes United States government foreign aid and this aid 
Granger-causes FDI. Two important policy implications follow from my findings. One, 
evidence that FDI Granger-causes United States government foreign aid reveals a possible 
geostrategic motive behind the decisions of United States agencies to deploy aid to Sub-
Saharan Africa. And two, evidence of bidirectional intertemporal relationships between 
United States government foreign aid flows and FDI flows could inform policy makers 
intent on deploying aid or incentivizing FDI as policy instruments to improve economic 







 In this thesis, I analyze intertemporal relationships between United States 
government foreign aid flows and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from anywhere in 
the world to twenty-three Sub-Saharan African countries. FDI is investment a private entity 
into businesses located in other countries establishing foreign business operations. In 
Figure 1, I include a map of Africa; in Table 1, I name the twenty-three countries in my 
dataset. For the purposes of my analysis, I define aid to include United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) deployed foreign aid plus all foreign aid deployed 
separately by other United States government agencies such as the Departments of 
Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, and State, as well as the African 
Development Foundation and the Peace Corps. In every case, the United States Congress 
appropriates the foreign-aid funds to these agencies, which deploy these funds according 
to their respective agency objectives. 
 






In principle, the answer to my research question is independent of whether United 
States government foreign aid and FDI individually promote or inhibit economic growth 
and well-being in the recipient countries. Nevertheless, understanding each of these 
relationships—that is, aid and growth, and FDI and growth—is important to understanding 
the implications of my findings. For example, if United States government foreign aid and 
FDI individually promote economic growth and well-being, and meanwhile aid induces 
FDI or vice versa, then the two flows could form a virtuous circle of economic 
development; likewise, if aid or FDI flows individually inhibit economic growth and well-
being, and meanwhile aid induces FDI or vice versa, then the two flows could form a 
vicious circle. Understanding these intertemporal relationships would allow policy makers 
intent on deploying aid or incentivizing FDI as policy instruments to craft policies to direct 
the appropriate flows—that is, aid or FDI—accordingly. In this thesis, I measure aid and 
FDI in terms of the money received by countries based on data I retrieve from USAID and 
UNCTAD. 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s history of colonialism has long compromised the region’s 
economic growth. For the last several hundred years, European nations, including for 
example the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium, colonized the continent in search of 
markets, raw materials, and, most tragically, forced labor (Ocheni and Nwankwo 2012). 
Colonizers commanded, controlled, and exploited local communities and their people, 
administering their lives, and profiting accordingly. In his work, The West and Rest of Us, 
Chinweizu (1975) explains that European colonizers exploited Africa’s resources for 
power and profit. Colonialism shaped African cultures and economies in ways that 





Today, Sub-Saharan Africa is an area rich with untapped potential in the forms of oil, 
diamonds, and gold, for example. These resources have the promise to develop the region 
beyond its current state to a better future. From poor health conditions to low human capital 
and physical capital accumulation to low investments in infrastructural development, Sub-
Saharan Africa faces several challenges.  
Health conditions on the continent continue to hinder sustainable long-term economic 
growth. Male and female life expectancies are 57 and 59 years for western Africa, 72 and 
75 years for northern Africa, 63 and 67 years for eastern Africa, and 61 and 67 years for 
southern Sub-Saharan Africa, respectively (Statista 2011). Based on these statistics, the 
potential to grow human capital in the region is substantial. Moreover, investments in 
physical capital and prudent stewardship of natural resources could further improve 
production possibilities and create jobs in the region. Human capital and physical capital 
and natural resources are the principal factors of production, upon which economic growth 
depends, ceteris paribus.  
For better or worse, the international community has often heralded aid and FDI as 
solutions to the Sub-Saharan challenges. For example, since 1960, Sub-Saharan Africa has 
received more than one trillion dollars in aid from the rest of the world. Since the Second 
World War, the United States government alone has regularly deployed foreign aid to 
several countries on the African continent. In 2019, the Sub-Saharan Africa received 
roughly $7.1 billion in aid (CRS Report 2020). Contributors have intended much of the aid 
to Sub-Saharan Africa since 2010 to improve health conditions.  
In principle, foreign aid can contribute to improving sanitation, food distribution, and 





introduces new technology domestically (Alfaro et al., 2010). In any case, the evidence 
that aid and FDI achieve their objectives is mixed. For example, in the case of aid, Kosack 
and Tobin (2006) argue that foreign aid strongly influences human development and 
economic growth; while Gatune (2010) emphasizes that development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa stretches beyond the influence of foreign aid. And in the case of FDI, Blomstrom 
and Kokko (1996) conclude that FDI could promote economic development by improving 
productivity growth; while Okechukwu et al. (2018) finds the positive relationship between 
FDI and economic growth in Nigeria is driven by oil exports, only.  
In only a few peer-reviewed studies do researchers examine the relationship between 
aid and FDI. And the results of those studies are mixed: some conclude, if anything, aid 
attracts FDI, though not consistently so. Based on my panel dataset of twenty-three Sub-
Saharan countries and the results of pooled-OLS and panel fixed-effects regressions, and 
panel Granger causality tests, I show that aid and FDI are intertemporally related, and that 
political stability, government effectiveness, and corruption control measures affect the 
inflow of aid and or FDI to countries in my sample. Additionally, I show that Granger-
causality is bidirectional: FDI Granger-causes United State government foreign aid and 
this aid Granger-causes FDI. Perhaps most interestingly, evidence that FDI Granger-causes 
United States government foreign aid reveals a possible geostrategic motive behind the 
decisions of United States agencies to deploy aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Finally, my evidence of the bidirectional intertemporal relationships between United 
States government foreign aid flows and FDI flows could inform policy makers intent on 
using aid or FDI as policy instruments to improve economic well-being in recipient 





example, considering my evidence that United States government foreign aid flows induce 
FDI flows, if policy makers reason FDI flows improve economic well-being in recipient 
countries, then policy makers would do well to understand this intertemporal relationship 
when they decide how and where to deploy aid.   
2.0. US Aid 
In this thesis, I study the intertemporal relationships between United States government 
foreign aid flows and FDI flows from anywhere in the world to twenty-three Sub-Saharan 
African countries. I define United States government foreign aid to include United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) deployed foreign aid plus foreign aid 
deployed separately by other United States government agencies such as the Departments 
of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, and State, as well as the African 
Development Foundation and the Peace Corps. In every case, the United States Congress 
appropriates the foreign-aid funds deployed by these agencies. In Appendix 2, I list all such 
United States government agencies. In Table 1, I list the twenty-three Sub-Saharan 
countries in my sample.  
 Table 1. Countries in the Balanced Panel 
Angola  Guinea Nigeria 
Benin  Guinea-Bissau Rwanda 
Burkina Faso  Kenya   Senegal  
Cabo Verde  Lesotho  Sierra Leone  
Chad Malawi Tanzania  
Cote d’Ivoire  Mozambique  Togo 
Gambia  Namibia Uganda 






The source of my data on United States foreign aid flows is USAID, which is an 
independent agency responsible for reporting to Congress and to the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) information related to all official United 
States government foreign aid activities by all United States government agencies. As such, 
USAID regularly publishes its Publication of the Annual U.S. Loans and Grants for 
Congress and its annual assistance report to the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the OECD (CRS Report 2020). Thus, USAID both reports information on United 
States government foreign aid on behalf of all United States government agencies and 
USAID deploys foreign aid funds in its role as a government agency. Hereafter, to avoid 
confusion, I refer to the sum of USAID-deployed foreign aid plus foreign aid deployed 
separately by other United States government agencies as United States government 
foreign aid.  
For example, in Table 2, I report United States government foreign aid flows to Ghana, 
Kenya, and Senegal—three Sub-Saharan countries in my sample—for 2005. For each 
agency listed in Table 2, I report the share of foreign aid flows deployed by that agency. 
Take, for example, the case of the Department of Agriculture and Ghana: according to 
Table 2, in 2005, the Department of Agriculture deployed 25.1 percent of United States 
government foreign aid flows (of $74.6 million listed in the final row of Table 2) to Ghana. 
In the case of Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal in 2005, then, based on Table 2, the United States 
government agencies that deployed most funds to these countries were USAID, the 
Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of State, and the Department 
of Agriculture. Finally, in Figure 2, I illustrate the time series of United States government 





States government foreign aid flows deployed in 2005—the $74.6 million (Ghana), $227.4 
million (Kenya), and $49.9 million (Senegal) that I report in the last row of Table 2—
appear in Figure 2 as data points associated with the year 2005. 
 
 
Table 2: United States Government Foreign-Aid Flows to Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal 
in 2005 [% distribution] 
 
Sources of funding (Department) Ghana Kenya Senegal 
African Development Foundation 2.4 - 1.6 
Department of Agriculture 25.1 30.6 5.38 
Department of Defense 1.8 1.7 3.7 
Department of Health and Human Services 2.7 4.4 3.5 
Department of State 8.6 42.9 0.76 
Department of the Interior 0.1 0.1 - 
Department of the Treasury 0.7 - 1.1 
Department of the Commerce 0.02 - - 
Millennium Challenge Corporation 0.4 - 0.20 
Peace Corps 2.7 1.12 5.8 
Trade and Development Agency 0.3 0.5 0.002 
USAID 55.2 18.6 78.6 
Total Funds Allocated (US million Dollars) 74.6 227.4 49.9 







Figure 2. United States Government Foreign-Aid Flows to Ghana, Kenya, and 




In Table 3, I report total United States government foreign aid flows to all twenty-three 
countries in my sample combined for 2005.  As in the case of Table 2, in Table 3, for each 
agency, I report the share of foreign aid flows deployed by that agency. 
For example, according to the information in Table 3, in the year 2005, the Department 
of Agriculture deployed 24.8 percent of United States government foreign aid flows (of 
$1,558.7 million) to the twenty-three countries in my sample combined. Finally, in Figure 
3, I illustrate in a pie chart the distribution of these aid flows to all twenty-three countries 
combined; here I focus on three principal agencies: namely, the Departments of Agriculture 
and State, and USAID. Next, I discuss the outcomes these principal agencies intend their 






Table 3: United States Government Foreign-Aid Flows to Twenty-Three Sub-Saharan 
Countries [year 2005] 
Sources of funding (Department/agency) % of distribution 
African Development Foundation 0.55 
Department of Agriculture 24.84 
Department of Defense 1.92 
Department of Health and Human Services 4.44 
Department of Labor 0.90 
Department of State 35.03 
Department of the Interior 0.04 
Department of the Treasury 0.24 
Department of the Commerce 0.001 
Millennium Challenge Corporation 0.11 
Peace Corps 1.99 
Trade and Development Agency 0.31 
USAID 29.62 





Figure 3. Distribution of United States Government Foreign-Aid Flows to Twenty-
Three Sub-Saharan Countries. [Source: USAID] 
 





Generally, the United States government deploys its foreign aid based on three key 
rationales: namely, national security, commercial interests, and humanitarian concerns. As 
such, the United States aims to strengthen its security by promoting its values, including 
good governance, peace and stability, humanitarian assistance, and investment in economic 
development. 
The United States government intends USAID-deployed funds to assist the recipient 
country and support technical-assistance programs aimed at improving trade regionally and 
between recipient countries and the United States. Further, examples of the intended 
outcomes of such technical-assistance programs include improving trade infrastructures 
like energy and transportation facilities. Several bilateral USAID missions support projects 
such as supporting private farmers, advancing nutrition, and treating child blindness 
(USAID 2021 and 2021a; CRS Report 2020). Thus, the United States government intends 
its foreign aid to assist the recipient country as well as the United States, because improving 
trade infrastructures like energy and transportation facilities could ultimately benefit the 
donor country. In any case, several bilateral USAID missions support projects in specific 
African countries (CRS Report, 2020).  
In May 2020, the Congressional Research Service outlined the objectives of USAID-
deployed aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. According to a CRS Report (2020), between 70 and 
75 percent of annual USAID-deployed funds since 2010 were directed towards health 
assistance. Addressing the growing concerns around HIV/AIDS, malaria, nutrition, and 
maternal and child health, much of the assistance was delivered via disease-specific 
initiatives. Aid was also directed to improve agricultural development, economic growth, 





Thus, an important objective for USAID is to encourage economic growth in 
developing countries, in part by supporting domestic private sector development, which 
may, in turn, attract FDI (CRS Report 2020). This helps to develop or deepen markets for 
exports from the United States. Additionally, USAID deploys foreign aid to complement 
the economic-growth effects of FDI, including FDI from the United States. In this way, 
USAID-deployed foreign aid indirectly benefits economic growth in the United States 
(USAID 2018). Put differently, United States government foreign aid aims to encourage 
investment and development in developing countries and achieve strategic priorities of the 
United States. 
The U.S. Department of State (DOS) represents American foreign policy globally; thus, 
ultimately, the agency intends its deployed foreign aid to improve the security of the 
American people. Additionally, the DOS intends to assist American businesses operating 
in foreign countries (US Department of State 2021). The DOS has developed a framework 
built on five objectives that inform how the agency deploys United States government 
foreign aid. The five objectives are economic growth, humanitarian assistance, peace and 
security, investing in people, and governing democratically (CRS Reports 2019). Sub-
Saharan Africa is important to the national security of the United States because of the 
continent’s business and trade opportunities, and its oil, gas, and precious-metal reserves. 
Increasingly, neutralizing cybercrimes and other such threats, which may emanate from the 
continent as the number of internet users there increase, is also important to the United 
States (Harris, 2017).  
Finally, the Department of Agriculture intends its deployed foreign aid to drive farm 





Department of Agriculture, several other federal agencies like the Department of 
Homeland Security, for example, also support aid programs in Sub-Saharan Africa (CRS 
Reports, 2008 and 2008a). 
3.0. Literature Review  
Sub-Saharan Africa is a region with a wealth of natural resources. Several factors 
explain why the region is underdeveloped. From poor institutions—consequences of a 
tragic history of colonization and exploitation to which I refer in my introduction (Chapter 
1)—to poor infrastructure to disease outbreaks, regions of Sub-Saharan Africa are very 
poor and underdeveloped. Two forms of foreign-capital inflows, foreign aid, and foreign 
direct investment (FDI), have, for years, shaped for better and for worse economic growth 
and development on the continent. Economic growth refers to increase in production of 
economic goods and services while economic development refers to creation of wealth 
from which a community benefit. In theory, because FDI and aid flows bring new 
technology, which essentially improves and deepens the domestic physical and human 
capital stocks, these flows accelerate economic development (Fambom 2013).  
As I demonstrate in this chapter, the current literatures on aid and FDI largely focus on 
the respective relationships of aid and FDI to economic growth. To my knowledge, in only 
a handful of peer-reviewed articles do researchers examine the relationship between aid 
and FDI: this is to say, the extent to which FDI flows follow—and, thus, are caused by—
aid flows or to what extent aid flows follow—and, thus, are caused by—FDI flows. 
Moreover, those studies find mixed results: some studies find, if anything, aid attracts FDI, 
though not consistently so. Simple correlations of time series of United States government 





sample are mostly, though not uniformly, positive (Appendix 1). And, in any case, whether 
over time one of these flows induces the other is not clear.  
In principle, my research question is independent of whether Untied States government 
foreign aid and FDI individually promote or inhibit economic growth and well-being in the 
recipient country. Nevertheless, understanding—and, so, separately reviewing the 
literature on—each of these relationships (in sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively) is important 
to understanding the implications of my findings. For example, if United States 
government foreign aid and FDI individually promote economic growth and well-being, 
and meanwhile aid induces FDI or vice versa, then the two flows could form a virtuous 
circle of economic development; likewise, if aid or FDI flows individually inhibit 
economic growth and well-being, and meanwhile aid induces FDI or vice versa, then the 
two flows could form a vicious circle. Understanding these intertemporal relationships 
would allow policy makers to craft policies directed towards the appropriate flow—that is, 
aid or FDI. In the following sections, I review separately the literature on aid and FDI, and 
the intertemporal relationships, if any, between the two.  
3.1. Aid  
The developing world’s countries, especially the least-developed countries, have 
received foreign aid for decades. Neoclassical economic theory implies that investments in 
physical capital, human capital, and new and improved technology generate economic 
growth. And because health and education are important aspects of human capital, 
investing in health and education (and, specifically, literacy) could have a positive impact 
on an economy by increasing labor productivity (Mushkin, 1962). Also, Sachs (2006) 





a normative outlook that, according to the author, recommends a set of goals for which to 
aspire. The author finds that aid improves growth among poor countries.  
At the same time, a rich literature exists that demonstrates the negative effects of aid 
on recipient countries. For example, Farag et al. (2009) argues that aid’s fungibility—and, 
thus, a recipient country’s government’s tendency to offset donor spending for a particular 
purpose by reducing its own expenditures on the same purpose—results in aid replacing 
instead of supplementing local spending. This replacement compromises foreign aid’s 
effectiveness, in part because of differences in the policy priorities of donors and recipients; 
this is particularly true in the health sector, which contributes to human capital. Results 
from the study suggest that donor and recipient governments’ incentives need to align with 
the donor agency to see a positive effect of aid being directed to a country. Thus, fungibility 
of aid can result in a negative impact on growth. In this way, foreign aid effectively 
influences government fiscal behavior. Indeed, Morrissey (2015) shows that the amount of 
aid a country receives will not necessarily translate to an equivalent increase in government 
spending by the recipient country. This is because the government is not aware of all aid 
available when making budget decisions to finance public goods.  
Wamboye et al. (2013) emphasize that quality of aid—whether it is geostrategic or non-
geostrategic—and quantity of aid matters to economic growth in Africa’s least-developed 
countries. Geostrategic aid is aid directed by the donor agency that helps build investment 
and trade opportunities with the recipient country that benefit the recipient country and the 
donor agency. Non-geostrategic aid is aid directed by the donor agency solely for the 
benefit of the recipient country. The authors introduce a new explanatory variable, legal 





continental civil law or the Anglo-Saxon law tradition. These variables allow the authors 
to learn whether aid is geostrategic in nature or not.  
Moreover, Wamboye et al. (2013) present three relationships between aid effectiveness 
and economic growth: the takeoff hypothesis, the conditionality requirement, and the aid-
quality argument. The takeoff hypothesis states that when the amount of the capital stock 
crosses the level an economy requires, meaningful growth enhancing effects are seen. 
Additionally, a sustained flow of foreign aid can help countries access additional resources 
required to takeoff into sustainable growth. The conditionality requirement states that 
foreign aid is effective when the economy has good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies. 
Finally, the aid-quality requirement states that aid effectiveness is based on geostrategic 
and non-strategic considerations. The authors argue that non-geostrategic aid has growth 
enhancing effects while geostrategic aid has a neutral effect. Finally, the authors conclude 
that macroeconomic policy management aimed at fiscal, monetary, and trade policies is 
critical to the effectiveness of foreign aid. As an additional source of domestic finance, aid 
increases the recipient country’s investment potential. In this case, aid presents an 
opportunity to tackle poverty. 
On the matter of geostrategic aid, Minoiu and Reddy (2009) find the UK and France 
predominantly direct aid to their former colonies. Separating developmental and non-
developmental aid, the authors conclude developmental aid promotes long-term growth. 
The authors conduct their analysis using data from 1960 to 2000. They conclude that non-
democratic colonies receive more aid than democratic non-colonies. Furthermore, 
Japanese and French aid favored former colonies or allied partners based on UN General 





of aggregate aid levels in the 1990’s was due to the Cold War coming to an end. The authors 
examined a sample of 17 OECD donor countries that were members of the organization 
during the 1990. Conclusions revealed, contrary to the general norm of aid being altruistic 
in nature, donor countries gave foreign aid to former allies, a strategy donor country used 
that prioritized the political loyalties of aid-recipient countries. 
A country receives foreign aid in different forms. Maruta and Banerjee (2020) chose 
seventy-four countries from Africa, Asia, and South America and focus on three industry 
sectors: namely, agriculture, health, and education, which receive the most foreign aid. 
Educational aid in the study is a sum of aid transferred to primary, secondary, and post-
secondary education. The United Nations directs its systemic development goals (SDGs) 
to these same three sectors. Additionally, the authors use sectoral foreign aid instead of 
aggregate foreign aid for their analysis. Results show that aid directed to the educational 
sector has a positive effect on economic growth. Furthermore, the authors mention that aid 
efficacy increases as institutional quality improves. In summary, according to the authors, 
the donor and recipient country must decide which sector has the highest returns and needs 
immediate attention, all while having a good institutional framework. 
Dong and Fan (2020) examined the effect of China’s aid and official development 
assistance to forty-seven African countries in four different categories: namely, economic 
infrastructure, social infrastructure, governmental budget support, and aid invested in 
productive sectors, from 2003 to 2013. The authors conclude that aid has a positive and 
significant impact on Africa’s economic growth. However, official development assistance 
does not play a large role in the countries’ development. Interestingly, the authors find that 





positive effect on growth is conditional on high corruption control. This is because aid to 
government may encourage corruption.  
Furthermore, government variables such as political stability, government effectiveness, 
corruption control affect the economy. Poor conditions in this regard have dissuaded donor 
countries from continuing to provide aid. Additionally, low levels of political stability and 
corruption control also discourage private entities from investing their funds (Alberto and 
Weder, 2002). On the other hand, having continuous support from a donor country helps 
the recipient country build foreign relations with the donor and potentially other countries. 
In any case, an increase in aid can alter the recipient country’s real exchange rate, and 
hence lead to a situation of Dutch disease, where the recipient country initially benefits 
from large increases in development and income in one sector (for example, natural 
resources) only to deal with declines in development and income in other sectors. 
Obviously, a recipient country is best to avoid this paradoxical outcome in which 
improvements in one sector have a negative impact of the country’s overall economy. In 
principle, Africa’s wealth of natural resources poses a risk of Dutch disease, because large 
amounts of aid directed to only one sector—in this example, natural resources—could 
result in high initial returns in one sector followed by a decline in returns in other sectors. 
In a sample of five African countries, Hussain et al. (2009) examine the macroeconomic 
challenges that aid presents. The authors identify macroeconomic constraints such as 
inflationary pressures, human capital constraints, and sectoral and administrative capacity 
as challenges a nation experiences as aid levels surge in the country. Additionally, the 
authors look at whether a rise in aid leads to real exchange rate appreciations and how fiscal 





rate appreciation and thus a Dutch disease. Furthermore, the authors highlight the 
implications of aid absorbed versus aid spent. Aid absorption refers to the extent to which 
the current account deficit excluding aid widens in response to an increase in aid inflows. 
Aid spent refers to the widening of the government fiscal deficit, net of aid, that 
accompanies an increase in aid. The authors conclude that neither aid absorbed nor spent 
is a good strategy in the short run when aid inflows are unstable.  
There is evidence that aid affects the fiscal behavior of the recipient country. Morrissey 
(2015) investigates the effect of taxes levied by the recipient country’s government on the 
recipient country’s behavior since 2005. The author concludes that a given amount of aid 
to a country will not lead to an equivalent increase in that recipient country’s government 
spending. Additionally, an increase in aid to the recipient country can influence domestic 
(recipient-country) tax rates, thus influencing tax revenues. For example, an increase in aid 
can lead to higher tax rates; and higher tax revenues and, thus, expenditures could improve 
the efficacy of aid. 
Despite the ostensible benefits of foreign aid that I have reviewed so far, several 
researchers question whether foreign aid benefits the recipient country. Easterly and Tobias 
(2008) examine the best and worst practices in foreign aid. The authors argue three types 
of aid are particularly ineffective: food aid, technical assistance, and tied aid. Tied aid must 
be used by the recipient country to procure goods from the donor country, potentially 
overpricing goods to the recipient country. Food aid could compromise the effectiveness 
of aid by effectively dumping goods—often excess agricultural production from the donor 
country—on to recipient countries, thus stunting the development of industries in the 





general knowledge, skills, and technical know-how in the recipient country. While such 
aid may benefit the recipient country, technical assistance often reflects, and thus 
advantages, donor-country—and not necessarily recipient-country—priorities.  
Easterly (2007) questions whether development assistance is a mistake. Based on his 
analysis of the extant literature, the author reasons that development assistance failed to 
achieve its objective of stimulating development. For example, despite Sub-Saharan Africa 
receiving $568 billion dollars (in 2007 US dollars) over the period of 42 years since 1965, 
per capita growth of the median African nation was close to zero over this time. According 
to the author, the only country to develop as intended because of aid inflows and technical 
assistance is South Korea. And even in this case, development occurred when aid to the 
country fell off. Based on Easterly (2007), Easterly and Tobias (2008), and others, the 
effects of aid on the recipient country are ambiguous.  
In her book Dead Aid, Dambisa Moyo (2009) argues that aid has not helped Africa; 
instead, aid worsened the situation on the continent. According to the author, aid has been 
a political, economic, and humanitarian disaster. Aid has impoverished many of its 
recipients and reduced economic growth. Moyo (2009) gives a brief history of aid to Sub-
Saharan Africa for each decade since 1960. Aid in the 1960s was directed toward 
industrialization. By 1965, aid to Sub-Saharan Africa crossed $900 million. However, by 
the end of the decade, infrastructural development remained insufficient. In the following 
decade, donor countries directed aid to alleviate poverty.   
Further, Moyo (2009) cites reasons for why aid has not worked in Africa. Sub-Saharan 
Africa received more than $1 trillion in aid from rich countries. One reason Moyo (2009) 





the Marshal Plan were directed to European countries post the Second World War. This 
helped European countries re-establish their economic, social, and political institutions. 
Aid was directed to Sub-Saharan Africa using the Marshal Plan achievements as a 
blueprint. However, Moyo (2009) points to the fact that European countries benefitted from 
aid because they had the institutional framework in place and only needed funds to help 
these institutions work again. Additionally, Marshal plan funds were finite. However, Sub-
Saharan Africa received aid continuously since 1960, causing governments there to view 
aid as a continuous source of income and, thus, stopping institutions from long-term 
financial planning. 
Moyo (2009) also points to an institutional framework that can help Africa. She argues 
that although democratic regimes have several positive effects such as reducing corruption, 
protecting businesses, and promoting transparent economic policies, poor countries need a 
decisive dictator who can push for economic policies for economic development. 
Furthermore, the author mentions that democracy is not a prerequisite for economic growth 
and that economic growth does not require aid. Additionally, the author mentions that aids 
effectiveness is compromised because of aid being fungible, an argument like the one made 
by Farag et al. (2009). Finally, Moyo (2009) mentions that results of aid-driven 
interventions have led to a drastic drop of countries into poverty. 
In summary, aid to Sub-Saharan Africa has had mixed—and often unambiguously 
negative—outcomes for recipient countries. Such results show that aid efficacy in Sub-
Saharan Africa is highly questionable. Furthermore, governance issues may explain some 
of these negative outcomes. Research suggests that the governance environments of 





difficult to achieve; as Pomerantz (2004) argues, knowledge and understanding of local 
cultures and institutional ineffectiveness make it challenging for donor agencies to direct 
funds effectively. 
3.2. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Several researchers have examined the relationship between FDI and economic growth. 
Like aid, in principle, FDI could have a positive impact on growth. As firms invest abroad, 
they introduce new technology and skilled labor and stimulate competition between 
domestic (in-country) producers. Thus, FDI could benefit the economy, in part by 
producing positive externalities. However, a recipient country could disadvantage itself by 
depending too much on these investments. Too much reliance on FDI leaves the domestic 
market vulnerable and susceptible to global markets. As reliance on FDI increases, 
domestic firms’ progress is hindered as foreign firms’ capital and technical advancement 
take precedence. Furthermore, domestic governments may redirect funds towards the 
efforts and objectives of foreign firms, so the benefit of FDI to the domestic economy is at 
best short term. More importantly, FDI dependency can worsen income inequality, social 
unrest, and political instability (Kosak and Tobin 2006). Moreover, political instability 
could negatively affect the investment climate in the recipient country, in turn negatively 
affecting FDI inflows (Nazeer and Masih 2017). 
Several authors have investigated the causal relationships between FDI and economic 
growth and economic development. For example, Blomstrom and Kokko (1996) examine 
the effect of FDI on host countries. They conclude that FDI could promote economic 
development by improving productivity growth, thereby increasing the value of 





promote economic growth, the authors state that the recipient country’s institutional 
framework is an important determinant of FDIs efficacy.  
Blomstrom et al. (1996) show that fixed investments (in physical capital and 
technology, for example) prove more effective for economic growth when additional 
factors such as economic policies, the institutional framework, and the political climate are 
strong. Bolmstorm and Kokko (1996) agree that FDI drives economic growth in the 
recipient economy provided the institutional conditions there are strong. 
Based on a panel dataset of 179 countries from 1980 to 2011, Herzer et al. (2015) find 
that FDI has a positive effect on health at low levels of recipient-country income, but the 
sign changes as income levels increase. Additionally, the authors mention that while 
morbidity and mortality are correlated, the lack of data on morbidity variables such as 
doctor visits and healthy life expectancy, does not allow them to focus on morbidity. 
Morbidity refers to an acute illness like respiratory infection or diabetes, while mortality 
refers to the number of deaths caused by fatal conditions. The authors identify the relation 
between FDI and health as non-linear. 
Giammanco and Gitto (2019) offer an alternative take on FDI and health. Examining 
the relationship between health expenditures and FDI in 28 countries of the European 
Union, the authors find population health, health systems, and governance infrastructure 
are important factors that attract FDI. Furthermore, the authors consider health in terms of 
quality of life as opposed to life expectancy. Finally, they emphasize the need to improve 





Arbatli (2011) examines the indicators of FDI in emerging market economies and, in 
doing so, focuses on economic policies. The author concludes that pull factors, such as 
political conflicts, inflation, the real exchange rate, and economic policy variables such as 
corporate tax and tariff rates, significantly impact FDI. The author finds that politically 
unstable countries attract lower amounts of FDI compared to politically stable countries.  
Africa, despite its abundant natural resources, presents several reasons for low FDI 
inflow compared to other nations. Reasons such as poor infrastructure to poor institutional 
qualities to low domestic savings, hamper the inflow of foreign capital in the form of FDI. 
At the same time, Sub-Saharan Africa is also a region where large amounts of foreign aid 
are directed to fulfill several global requirements (Alesina and Dollar, 2000)  
The African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA), 2018, brokered by the African 
Union, was introduced with the objective to increase regional co-operation, to promote 
trade and to reduce tariffs between African countries. Regional cooperation is where the 
governments, local and national, collaborate to work together and promote national 
interests. I reason that such cooperation improves governance. This can be a positive 
incentive for foreign investors and donor countries directing FDI and aid, respectively. The 
UNCTAD 2019 reports that FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa increased by 11 percent in the 
previous year. This is evidence that regional cooperation between African countries helped 
attract FDI (Bezuidenhout, 2009). 
Another question addressed by a few authors is whether FDI crowds in or crowds out 
domestic investment. Crowding out is a phenomenon where one type of spending—for 
example, government spending—lowers another type of spending—for example, private-





the other. Agosin and Mayer (2000) examine three developing regions in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America; and they examine two time periods, 1976-1985 and 1986–1996. The 
authors conclusions differ by region: they find that FDI crowds-in domestic investment in 
Asia and in Africa. However, the results for Latin America are inconclusive. In conclusion, 
the authors found no certainty in the effect of FDI on domestic investment.  
In a study of twenty-two African countries, Asiedu (2002, 2006) shows that natural-
resource endowments, large local market size, and healthy infrastructure promote FDI in 
Africa. The author examines market size in relation to the government policies and 
institutional variables which attract FDI. Using data from 2000 to 2002, the author 
demonstrates that South Africa’s domestic markets contribute 46 percent to Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s GDP. Whereas corruption and political instability have a negative effect on 
economic growth and development and reduce FDI inflows throughout the region.  
FDI, like aid, is a double-edged sword. A certain amount of FDI could have positive 
effects in the recipient economy (for example, by improving physical capital and human 
capital and growing skilled labor), while dependence on FDI could have negative effects 
on the recipient economy (for example, by driving private firms out of business and 
increasing income inequality). And like aid, the incentives a potential recipient country 
establishes to attract FDI could alter the dynamics of the recipient country’s economy 
(Kosack and Tobin, 2006). For example, foreign firms entering the domestic economy 
could help domestic firms improve by augmenting their efficiency, knowledge and skills, 
and productivity. However, too much dependence on foreign firms could have negative 
results and hamper the domestic economy. Kosack and Tobin (2006), who demonstrate the 





is largely dependent on characteristics of the recipient economy, such as economic 
freedom, competition, opportunity for growth.  
Furthermore, the existing literature demonstrates that democracies spend more on 
human development compared to autocracies. Zweifel and Navia (2003) show that 
democracies cater to their citizens’ needs better than autocracies do. Additionally, the 
knowledge that a democratic country’s government is superior in terms of political justice 
and basic well-being attracts FDI. Brown and Hunter (1999), who examine Latin American 
countries from 1970 to 2000, find that a democratic regime is important in the long run for 
health and education spending. Moreover, democratic principles and practices allow for 
resources to be directed towards education and primary schooling. Such schooling 
improves human development.  
Technological spillovers because of FDI could lead to economic growth of the recipient 
country because technological advancements result in competition between domestic 
firms, forcing them to improve. As Robert M. Solow’s (1957) foundational work on 
economic growth demonstrates, long-run (steady-state) growth in output per person is due 
to technical changes rather than capital deepening or other such increases in factor inputs.  
Furthermore, Sumner (2005) shows that FDI is good for aggregate growth, which 
increases income earned by workers. However, income inequality rises as the returns to 
skilled labor rise above the returns for unskilled labor and, thus, reduce the income growth 
of the poor. Moreover, in their study of the impact of FDI on income inequality in Africa, 
Kaur et al. (2018) identify local conditions such as technology diffusion, quality of 
institutions, and human capital availability as important determinants of the impact of FDI 





Okechukwu et al. (2018) find mixed results when looking at the effect of FDI on 
Nigeria’s export economy. Initial results, looking at the aggregate effect of FDI, are 
significant and positive in the long run. However, when the authors disaggregate the effects 
of FDI by export categories, oil and non-oil, the authors report a positive relationship 
between FDI and economic growth for oil exports only. 
Finally, some critics of FDI argue that foreign firms’ vast organizational outreach could 
result in foreign firms promoting self-serving interests at the expense of recipient-country 
interests, effectively manipulating domestic markets, and thereby negatively affecting 
domestic firms (Porter, 2005). According to Porter (2005), in such cases, foreign firms do 
not completely transfer technology to recipient countries; instead, these firms use the 
recipient country’s relatively inexpensive labor for low-skilled activities and preserve high-
value-added activities in the foreign firm’s home-country. 
3.3. Intertemporal Relationships between Aid and FDI  
The separate literatures on aid and FDI that I review above raise an important question: 
are aid and FDI complements, substitutes, or neither? In theory, the effective usage of aid 
could attract FDI and, thus, deepen the capital stock of the recipient country. Aid that 
promotes this complementary relationship is termed catalytic aid. Aharsjo (2016) finds that 
development aid and FDI are indeed complements. Based on a sample of 35 largely middle-
income countries between 1987 and 2013, the author finds that a one-percent increase in 
aid stimulates a 0.5 percent increase in FDI after 3 years.  
Wang and Balasubramanyam (2011) show that aid complements FDI and, in so doing, 
promotes economic growth. The authors investigate the relationship between aid and FDI 





foreign firms are attracted to provinces that have received aid and improved their 
infrastructure accordingly. Furthermore, this complementarity promotes economic growth 
and development in the provinces. Additionally, the authors reason that their results have 
policy implications: for example, they propose that countries invest aid flows in public 
goods such as transportation facilities and education.   
Garriga and Phillips (2014) add to a growing literature on the effect of aid on FDI. They 
show how investment firms use data from recipient countries, specifically post-conflict 
countries, and show that aid to countries with little information availability—such as 
market size and or potential, institutions that affect investment—is a signal which can 
negatively influence investors’ behavior.  
Blaise (2005) and Kimura and Todo (2010) investigate whether FDI flows follow aid 
flows; this is to say, the authors investigate whether aid attracts FDI. Blaise (2005) 
considers how FDI responds to Japanese-government aid in select provinces of China, and 
whether Japanese aid influences the location choice of Japanese private investors. The 
author examines data from select provinces from 1980 to 1999. Considering aid in the form 
of physical capital and human capital and infrastructural development, the author 
concludes that aid and FDI are complements rather than substitutes.  
Kimura and Todo (2010) examine the complementarity between aid and FDI in 
Vietnam. Using data from different provinces in Vietnam, the authors conclude that aid 
has a positive impact on FDI inflows. Furthermore, the authors point to the positive impact 
of economic reforms that allowed Vietnam to reduce inflation from 160 percent to less than 
10 percent from 1988 to 1997, reduce poverty, and improve trade policies. In Figure 4, I 





as a percent GDP has increased since 1988. This upward trend reveals the positive effects 
of economic reforms put in place by the government of Vietnam. Additionally, in Figure 
4, I illustrate the country’s GDP, a measure of the size of the economy that can incentivize 
investors to direct FDI to the country. 
 
Figure 4. FDI in Vietnam 
Source: Wang and Balasubramanyam, V.N., (2011). 
 
Selaya and Sunesen (2012) show that aid draws in higher amounts of FDI when aid is 
invested in inputs that are complementary to physical capital; such inputs include, for 
example, education and health. However, when aid is invested directly in physical capital, 





depends crucially on the composition of aid. The study includes ninety-nine countries with 
data between 1975 and 2001. On balance, the authors conclude that the combined impact 
of aid and FDI is positive.  
Other studies that examine the relationship between aid and FDI empirically include 
Harms and Lutz (2006) and Karakaplan et.al (2005). Harms and Lutz (2006) use a sample 
of low- and middle-income countries whose population is greater than 1 million. They find 
mixed results. Based on the bivariate case, which does not include controls for recipient-
country governance, the authors find the effect of aid on FDI to be significant but negative. 
However, based on the multivariate case, which includes controls for governance, the 
authors find the effect of aid on FDI to be insignificant. Additionally, multivariate results 
lead the authors to conclude that all governance variables are significant.  
Bhavan et al. (2010) investigate whether aid attracts FDI in South Asian economies. 
The authors classify aid as aid for human capital, infrastructural development, and physical 
capital. Further, based on available data, the authors study the period from 1995 to 2007. 
The authors draw their results from four different analyses: namely, co-integration, 
Granger causality, fixed-effect panel regressions, and instrumental-variable techniques. 
Their sample contains four countries: Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. The 
authors conclude that aid in the forms of physical capital, human capital, and infrastructural 
development attracts FDI; this is to say, FDI is a complement to aid and not a substitute.  
Karakaplan et. al (2005) propose that aid gives rise to FDI inflows to countries where 
good governance and developed financial markets exist. Examining a panel data set of 97 
countries from 1960 to 2004, the authors hypothesize that countries that receive aid are, in 





effectiveness as indicators that can influence FDI inflows. Finally, the authors conclude 
that FDI does not necessarily flow to countries that receive aid. Rather, they claim that FDI 
flows to countries with good governance and developed financial markets.  
Garriga and Phillips (2014) conclude that development aid, one type of foreign capital, 
can attract FDI. However, this conclusion is dependent on whether the nation could use the 
aid efficiently. Political instability, corruption, and ineffective governance could reduce the 
efficacy of FDI. Meanwhile, Hooper and Kim (2007) find that high opacity—that is, a lack 
of transparency—negatively influences firms’ decisions to invest abroad. The authors 
examine three broad categories of international capital flows: namely, FDI, portfolio flows, 
and international bank lending. The authors show that high levels of opacity in accounting 
and reporting requirements lead to low levels of financial investment inflows. Ironically, 
opacity can increase profits for firms that invest abroad, because these firms can exploit 
opacity in accounting and reporting requirements.  
Thangami (2010) examines the relationship between FDI and aid in Southeast Asia 
and, in doing so, finds mixed results. The author finds aid inflows for human capital and 
infrastructure Granger cause FDI inflows to Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and India. 
Simultaneously, FDI inflows Granger cause aid inflows in the form of physical capital to 
Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and India. Thus, the direction of intertemporal precedence between 
aid and FDI is not entirely clear: each flow tends to Granger cause the other.  
The literature on the potential intertemporal relationships between aid and FDI that I 
have reviewed suggests that aid and FDI flows may be related over time. For example, 
foreign aid directed towards infrastructure and human capital development may create an 





effectively renders a country’s economy more conducive to the economic outcomes that 
FDI-induced improvements in technology, infrastructure, and physical capital could 
otherwise produce. Of course, FDI flows may attract aid, as well. 
4.0. Conceptual Framework 
In my analysis, I denote United States government foreign aid to Sub-Saharan African 
country 𝑖 at time 𝑡 as, 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡; and I denote FDI (from anywhere in the world) to Sub-Saharan 
African country 𝑖 at time 𝑡 as, 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡. To model the relationship(s) between 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡, I begin with Equation 1, in which I specify in general one possible relationship 
between the two flows. 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑓(𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡)                                                  (1) 
Equation 1 implies 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is a function of 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡; or, put differently, Equation 1 implies 
that 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 effectively attracts or causes 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡. Thus, in Equation 1, I assume the function, 
𝑓(. ), reflects the institutional frameworks of the Sub-Saharan African economies in my 
sample. In this first specification, these frameworks are, in effect, the processes that 
determine how, say, country 𝑖 produces 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 (the output) from United States government 
foreign aid, (𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡; the input). For the simplicity of this exposition, I suppress notation 
reflecting unobserved heterogeneity in the form of differences in institutional frameworks 
across countries; though, I control for this heterogeneity in my corresponding (fixed effect) 
panel regressions. 
I reason that FDI follows aid based on the work of Kosack and Tobin (2006) and Alfaro 
et al. (2010). For example, Kosack and Tobin (2006) show that foreign aid positively 





that an increase in foreign direct investment stimulates competition domestically and 
introduces new technology. Finally, I reason that before relying on technical assistance, it 
is important to have an educated and healthy human capital stock in place that can exploit 
the technical assistance associated with aid for the highest possible returns. For example, 
an interpretation of Equation 1 is that foreign aid directed to Nigeria improves human 
capital, effectively increasing labor supply. This pattern, in turn, attracts foreign private 
investors who direct FDI to Nigeria.  
Of course, Equation 1 reflects one side of the argument. In Equation 2, I specify an 
alternative relationship between the two flows. 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑔(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡)                                           (2) 
Equation 2 implies 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is a function of 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡; or, put differently, Equation 2 implies 
that 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 causes 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡. Thus, in Equation 2, I assume the function, 𝑔(. ), reflects the 
institutional frameworks of the Sub-Saharan African economies in my sample. In this 
second specification, these frameworks are, in effect, the technologies that determine how, 
say, country 𝑖 produces United States government foreign aid (𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡; the output) from 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 from the rest of the world (the input). Again, for the simplicity of this exposition, I 
suppress notation reflecting unobserved heterogeneity in the form of institutional 
frameworks across countries, which I control for in my corresponding (fixed effect) panel 
regressions. 
I reason that aid follows FDI based on the work by Asiedu (2002, 2006). The author 
shows that natural-resource endowments and strong infrastructure together induces FDI in 





economic growth to take place, both physical capital and human capital are necessary. With 
physical capital in place because of FDI, foreign aid could follow FDI. For example, an 
interpretation of Equation 2 is that Angola—which exports petroleum and diamonds, 
natural resources that require advanced technology to extract—benefits from FDI that 
builds the necessary technological infrastructure and transfers the necessary knowledge. 
This FDI coupled with aid inflows deepens human capital. In this way, private firms and 
government agencies could effectively work together to deploy FDI and aid. 
Perhaps a more intriguing interpretation of Equation 2 is that aid and the positive 
economic outcomes it intends also benefits the donor country—in my case, the United 
States. Thus, for example, because United States government foreign aid seeks to improve 
trade relations between the United States and the recipient countries as well as to bolster 
national security and reduce cybercrime, United States aid agencies may be drawn to 
countries where economic activity is rising due, in part, to FDI flows.  
In any case, I reason, based on the work of Harms and Lutz (2006) and Karakplan et 
al. (2005), that the effects of governance variables on aid and FDI flows can be significant. 
Because the extant literature indicates that institutional variables affect flows of aid and 
FDI, in my estimable versions of Equations 1 and 2, I include three institutional controls: 
namely, corruption control, government effectiveness, and political stability, which are 
likely related. For example, government effectiveness and or corruption control increases 
with high political instability. 
Finally, I also include GDP as a control. Broadly speaking, GDP is an indicator of an 
economy’s performance. As such, GDP could influence foreign aid and FDI inflows. FDI 





brings in new knowledge—on-the-job training, for example. The returns to these 
investments and the returns to aid may depend on the recipient-country GDP.  
With this reasoning, I investigate whether aid and FDI are intertemporally related in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, I check whether, over time, aid follows FDI or vice 
versa; to do so, I use a panel Granger-causality test that I describe in section 5.2. 
5.0. Data, Empirical Results, and Robustness Checks 
5.1. Data  
I collected data on United States government foreign aid and FDI from USAID and 
UNCTAD, respectively. I collected data on institutional governance variables—namely, 
corruption control, government effectiveness, and political stability—from the World 
Bank. I begin my data set in 1991 and I end my data set in 2018. My balanced panel consists 
of twenty-three countries from Sub-Saharan Africa; in Table 1, I list the twenty-three 
countries. I use the data available to make a balanced panel consisting of the twenty-three 
countries in Table 1.  
5.2. Empirical Results   
In Table 4, I report select summary statistics for the principal variables associated with 
the twenty-three Sub-Saharan countries in my sample. These variables are United States 
government foreign aid (aid), FDI, GDP, a (recipient) government effectiveness index 
(g_eff), a corruption-control index (c_con), and a political-stability index (p_stab). 
According to Table 4, since 1991, the mean annual amount of United States government 
foreign aid to the twenty-three countries in my sample is $108 million. The corresponding 
mean annual amount of FDI is $379.8 million. Finally, the mean annual level of GDP 







Table 4. Summary Statistics of Balanced Panel [in US $ millions] 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Aid 644 108 180 0.0598 1150 
FDI 644 379.8 1153.7 -7397.3 10028.2 
GDP 643 200 58800 206 547000 
G_eff 414 30.30 18.85 0.51 80.30 
C_con 414 31.66 19.41 1.50 75.50 
P_stb 414 33.92 20.31 0.97 93.75 
 
Source: USAID, UNCTAD, World Bank 
 
For the governance variables, each is an index in which a value of 100 indicates the 
highest level of governance, the mean annual percentile for government effectiveness index 
is 30.30 percent. Mean percentile rank for corruption control is 31.66 percent. Finally, 
mean annual percentile rank of the political stability index 33.92 percent.  
The range for all government variables is between 0.51 to 93.75. Thus, measures of the 
institutions of government vary substantially across countries and time. In Table 5, I report 
country-specific summary statistics for a sub sample of countries in my dataset; I report 
the full list in Appendix 3. Measures of institutions—g_eff, c_con, and p_stb—are 
percentile ranks that indicate where a country is positioned in relation to others with respect 
to institutional framework. For example, Chad’s government-effectiveness index (g_eff) is 
11.16, thus 88.4 percent of countries to which this index applies rank higher than Chad. 
Mean annual measures of political stability (p_stb) and government effectiveness (g_eff) 
are 16.58 and 25.64, respectively. Senegal’s corruption control ranked at 61.61; this implies 





Political stability and government effectiveness ranked at 57.65 and 46.6, respectively, for 
Senegal. Table 4 shows when all 23 countries are considered, corruption control ranked at 
75.50; this implies 24.5 percent ranked higher. 
In any case, these summary statistics on the institutions of government are important, 
because countries with weak institutions presumably dissuade donor countries and private 
investment interests from deploying funds to those countries. Put differently, we would 
expect donor countries and private interests to direct funds to countries where indicators 
such as government effectiveness, corruption control, and political stability are high. 
 Thus, based on the results from Tables 4 and 5, I reason that institutions of 
government are important drivers of United States government foreign aid and FDI. As I 
indicate in my review of literature (Chapter 3), Zweifel and Navia (2003) show that 
democracies (with presumably strong institutions) fare better than autocracies (with 
presumably weak institutions); and Farag et al. (2009) show that aid fungibility can 
negatively affect the economy. Thus, having a strong institutional framework is important. 
Furthermore, the institutional fragilities are likely correlated through time. In Figures 
5 and 6, I illustrate, for five select countries in my sample, times series of the government-
effectiveness index and the corruption-control index, respectively. Take Guinea-Bissau as 
an example. The government-effectiveness and corruption-control indexes for Guinea-
Bissau are each relatively low. I reason low corruption control can lead to government 
ineffectiveness. This is because low corruption control can lead both domestic institutions 






Table 5. Country Specific Statistics [in US $ million] 
Angola 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Aid 28 71.1 31.1 6.85 165 
FDI 28 -60.0109 3567.685 -7397.3 10028.22 
GDP 28 53500 50000 4440 146000 
G_eff 18 11.58006 3.812441 3.589744 17.22488 
C_con 18 5.679884 2.306732 1.522843 11.53846 
P_stb 18 27.20703 9.997511 1.587302 37.91469 
 
Chad 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 70.9 66.5 1.866 214 
FDI 28 186.7042 340.4556 -675.545 924.1192 
GDP 28 6190 4630 1180 13900 
G_eff 18 7.787425 6.035307 2.427185 25.64103 
C_con 18 4.874872 2.397414 1.456311 11.16751 
P_stb 18 9.837072 3.819301 4.326923 16.58768 
 
Gambia 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Aid 28 5.926 5.018 1.916 19.1 
FDI 28 31.74732 23.54257 -27.7 82.20818 
GDP 28 1070 357 487 1670 
G eff 18 29.24358 5.465048 18.75 37.94872 
C con 18 31.94687 7.366658 21.63461 46.9697 
P stb 18 47.57738 8.16363 30 69.31217 
 
Senegal 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Aid 28 97.7 123 20.4 657 
FDI 28 214.5099 208.3392 -7.44398 847.8416 
GDP 28 121000 586 4910 23200 
G eff 18 43.42549 6.468632 34.44976 57.65306 
C con 18 49.66724 9.737055 30.47619 61.61616 
P stb 18 38.67662 4.434365 27.51323 46.60194 
 





Nazeer and Masih (2017), Kosack and Tobin (2006), and Karakaplan et al. (2005) 
demonstrate the importance of a good institutional framework. Karakaplan et al. (2005) 
found countries with good governance received more aid in a panel of ninety-seven 
countries. Kosack and Tobin (2006) showed that aid effectiveness increased in countries 
where the institutional framework is sound—practically speaking, index measures such as 
political stability and corruption control are high. Finally, Nazeer and Masih (2017) 
showed that FDI inflows to Malaysia were negatively impacted by low levels of political 













Figure 5. Government Effectiveness Percentile Rank 












Figure 6. Corruption Control Percentile Rank 
[Source: World Bank] 
 
To test my central hypothesis that United State government foreign aid flows and FDI 
flows are intertemporally related in the ways that I propose in Equations 1 and 2 of my 
conceptual framework (Chapter 4), I estimate fixed-effects panel-regression models that 
take the general forms of Equations 3 and 4, where 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is the vector of observable 
institutional-control variables—namely, corruption control, government effectiveness, and 
political stability—that vary across country 𝑖 and across time 𝑡; 𝑐𝑖 captures unobserved 






𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑥𝑖,𝑡𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  (3) 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑥𝑖,𝑡𝛿 + 𝛾1𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  (4) 
Finally, based on Equations 3 and 4, I also conduct a (panel) Granger-causality test to 
determine the extent of temporal precedence between aid and FDI. To the extent that 
institutions of government are time invariant (across the relatively short timeframe that my 
dataset includes), their effects on aid and FDI flows may be captured by fixed-effects 
estimators, in which case I would not expect the indexes on their own to be significant. 
I model the intertemporal relationships between aid and FDI by lagging the 
independent variable: namely, 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 in Equation 3 and 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 in Equation 4. Before 
reporting the results of my panel regression tests, I report unit-root test results for aid and 
FDI. A unit root test is important because it indicates whether the data are stationary or not. 
The panel regressions and Granger-causality tests that follow are not appropriate if the data 
contain unit roots. I perform four panel unit-root tests: namely, Levin-Lin-Chu, Harris 
Tzavalis, Breitung, and Fisher. For each test, I have chosen a (default) lag length of 1. The 
null hypothesis of each test is that the panels contain unit roots; the alternative hypothesis 
is that the panels are stationary. 
Taken together, the results of the unit-root tests are somewhat inconclusive. The p-
values (of 0.1935 and 0.8047, respectively) for Levin-Lin-Chu and Breitung unit-root tests 
for aid are greater than 0.01, hence based on these tests, I fail to reject the null hypothesis 
that the panel contains unit roots. However, the p-values for the Harris-Tzavalis and Fisher 
tests are each 0.00; thus, based on these tests, I reject the null hypothesis and conclude the 





Similarly, in the case of FDI, the p-values (of 0.0841 and 0.0834, respectively) for 
Levin-Lin-Chu and Breitung unit-root tests are greater than 0.01 (though not greater than 
0.10), hence based on these tests, I fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude the panel 
contains unit roots. However, the p-values for Harris-Tzavalis and Fisher tests are 0.000 
and 0.0005, respectively; thus, based on these tests, I reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude the panel is stationary.   
For now, I presume the times series data in my panel regressions are stationary and I 
proceed accordingly. In my robustness checks (section 5.3), I address the inconclusive 
nature of my unit-root tests. Thus, in Tables 6 and 7, I report the results of my fixed-effects 
panel-regressions in which I include United States government foreign aid and FDI in 
levels. 
In Table 6, I report results based on equation 3, where the dependent variable is  
In column 1, I report the results of a baseline OLS (pooled) regression. In this case, I obtain 
a coefficient estimate of , the term attached to the lagged independent variable, 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1, 
of 2.712; this coefficient estimate is statistically significant at the 0.01 percent level. I 
interpret this coefficient estimate to mean a $1 increase in United States government 
foreign aid to the recipient country is correlated with a $2.71 increase in FDI from 
anywhere in the world to the recipient country. In this regression, I obtain an R-squared 
value of 0.162; this implies the model explains 16.2 of the variation in the dependent 







Table 6. Panel Regression Results, FDI as Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 















 (0.468) (0.900) (0.582) (0.549) (0.541) (0.541) (0.839) 










   (0.00241) (0.00212) (0.00212) (0.00194) (0.00179) 





    (1.412e+07) (1.559e+07) (1.366e+07) (1.520e+07) 
C_con     7.867e+06 1.075e+07 1.089e+07 
     (8.817e+06) (9.325e+06) (1.085e+07) 
P_stb      -1.256e+07 -1.145e+07 
      (1.074e+07) (1.095e+07) 
Constant 1.089e+08 
** 





 (4.473e+07) (8.993e+07) (5.631e+07) (4.272e+08) (4.334e+08) (5.717e+08) (6.032e+08) 
        
Observations 644 644 642 414 414 414 414 
R-squared 0.162 0.122 0.151 0.102 0.103 0.112 0.146 
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No No No No Yes 
Robust SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
countries 
 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Aid: Current Aid; FDI: Foreign Direct Investment; GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
G_eff: Government Effectiveness; C_con: Corruption Contribution. 
P_stab: political Stability 
 
In column 2, I report results of my first fixed-effects panel regression. I obtain a 
coefficient estimate of  2.54. This coefficient estimate is statistically significant at the 
0.01 percent level. I interpret this coefficient estimate to mean a $1 increase in United 
States government foreign aid to the recipient country is correlated with a $2.54 increase 
in FDI from anywhere in the world to the recipient country. In this regression, I obtain an 
R-squared value of 0.122; this implies the model explains 12.2 percent of the variation in 
the dependent variable, .  
In column 3, I report fixed-effects results where I include GDP as an independent 





private investment interests alike. A country’s GDP is an indicator of the economy’s size, 
something donor agencies and private entities likely use to estimate returns on investment. 
I obtain a coefficient estimate on 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝑡 of 0.00539; this coefficient estimate is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 percent level. I interpret this coefficient to mean a $1 increase in 
GDP of the recipient country is correlated with a $0.0054 increase in FDI from the rest of 
the world to the recipient country. Additionally, I obtain an R-squared value of 0.151; this 
implies the model explains 15.1 percent variation in the dependent variable, . 
In columns 4 through 7, I add additional controls. Here, I discuss the results I obtain in 
column 6, based on a fixed-effects panel regression in which I include all three 
institutional-control variables but no year fixed effects. I obtain a coefficient estimate on 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 of 1.471; this coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.05 percent level. I 
interpret this to mean a $1 increase in United States government foreign aid results in a 
$1.47 increase in FDI from the rest of the world to the recipient country. I obtain an R-
squared value of 0.112; thus, this model explains 11.2 percent in the independent variable, 
 
In Table 7, I report results based on Equation 4, in which my dependent variable is 
. In column 1, I report the results of a baseline OLS (pooled) regression. In this case, 
I obtain a coefficient estimate of , the term attached to the independent variable, 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1, 
of 0.0659; this coefficient estimate is statistically significant at the 0.01 percent level. I 
interpret this coefficient to mean a $1 increase in FDI from anywhere in the world to the 





aid to the recipient country. In this regression, I obtain an R-squared value of 0.157: thus, 
this model explains 15.7 percent of the variation in the dependent variable, .  
In column 3, I report fixed-effects panel regression results of the effect of GDP on aid. 
I obtain a coefficient estimate on 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝑡 of 0.00158; this coefficient estimate is statistically 
significant at the 0.01 percent level. I interpret this coefficient to mean a $1 increase in the 
GDP of the recipient country is correlated with a $ 0.0016 increase in United States 
government foreign aid to the recipient country. Finally, in this regression, I obtain an R-
squared value of 0.272; thus, the model, when I consider lagged FDI and lagged GDP, 
explains 27.2 percent of the variation in the dependent variable 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1.  
In columns 4 through 7, I add additional controls. Here, I discuss the results I obtain in 
column 6, based on a fixed-effects panel regression in which I include all three 
institutional-control variables but no year fixed effects. I obtain a coefficient estimate on 
𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1 of 0.0210. This coefficient is not statistically like those in columns 1 through 5 
and 7. I interpret this to mean a $1 increase in GDP of the recipient country will result in 
$0.02 increase in FDI to the recipient country from the rest of the world. I obtain an R-










Table 7. Panel Regression Results, Aid as Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES AID AID AID AID AID AID AID 











 (0.0132) (0.0307) (0.0173) (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0124) (0.00622) 










   (0.000392) (0.000382) (0.000376) (0.000380) (0.000182) 
G_eff    -1.445e+06 -2.203e+06 -2.159e+06 42,535 
    (2.290e+06) (2.994e+06) (3.134e+06) (3.205e+06) 
C_con     1.284e+06 1.319e+06 -890,782 
     (2.189e+06) (2.154e+06) (2.294e+06) 
P_stb      -154,137 -36,593 














 (7.075e+06) (1.092e+07) (9.714e+06) (7.328e+07) (6.438e+07) (6.272e+07) (5.295e+07) 
        
Observations 643 643 641 414 414 414 414 
R-squared 0.157 0.118 0.272 0.200 0.202 0.202 0.345 
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No No No No Yes 
Robust SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
countries 
 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Aid: Current Aid; FDI: Foreign Direct Investment; GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
G_eff: Government Effectiveness; C_con: Corruption Contribution. 
P_stab: political Stability 
 
The results that I report in Tables 6 and 7 show that lagged FDI has a larger effect on 
United States government foreign aid than aid has on FDI. In any case, these results do not 
show whether United States government foreign aid and FDI are intertemporally related 
(in the sense of Granger causality). To assess causality between aid and FDI, I perform a 
panel Granger-causality test (Thangami, 2011; Bhavan et al. 2010). The panel Granger-
causality test is used to investigate causality, in the sense of temporal precedence, between 
two time series variables in a panel regression; in my case, these two variables are United 





Granger (1969) investigated the causal relationship between variables econometrically. 
In an analysis consisting of two variables X and Y, the author demonstrates that if the null 
hypothesis is rejected, where the null hypothesis is X does not Granger cause Y, one can 
conclude that X Granger causes Y. Results from the test show the Wald statistic (W-bar), 
standardized statistic (Z-bar), and approximated standardized statistic (Z-bar tilde). To test 
the null hypothesis that X does not Granger-cause Y, I use the Z-bar and Z bar tilde test 
statistics. In either case, if the p-value is less than that associated with the appropriate 
significance level, I reject the null hypothesis (that X does not Granger-cause Y). 
I report the results of my panel Granger-causality tests in Tables 8 and 9. In Table 8, I 
report test results for the null hypothesis, United States government foreign aid does not 
Granger-cause FDI. I test this causal relationship with 7 lags of the hypothesized 
independent variable in this case, aid, based on the Akaike Information Criterion. In this 
case, the p-value is less than the significance level; therefore, I reject the null hypothesis 
and accept the alternative hypothesis: that is, United States government foreign aid does 















Table 8. Granger Causality Test Results: Whether Aid Granger-causes FDI  
 
Optimal number of lags (AIC): 7 (lags tested: 1 to 7) 
W-Bar 25.5402     
Z-Bar 23.7637 (p-value = 0.0000)    
Z-bar tilde 3.3739 (p-value = 0.0007)    
 
H0: Aid does not Granger-cause FDI. 
   H1: Aid does Granger-cause FDI for at least one country in the panel. 
 
 This test implies that, at least for some countries in my panel dataset, FDI flows from 
anywhere in the world follow United States government foreign aid flows. These results 
also imply that foreign aid is required before FDI, I presume because human capital 
improvement (to which aid is relatively well suited) is needed before technical 
advancement (to which FDI is relatively well suited). Furthermore, having technical 
assistance once human capital is in place benefits the country. Aid directed towards human 
capital and human capital development allows the recipient country to build its labor force 
so as take full advantage of technical advancements. 
In Table 9, I report test results for the null hypothesis, FDI does not Granger-cause 
United States government foreign aid. Again, I test this causal relationship with 7 lags of 
the hypothesized independent variable in this case, FDI, based on the Akaike Information 
Criterion. In this case, the p-value is again less than the significance level; therefore, I reject 
the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis: that is, FDI Granger-causes 







Table 9. Granger Causality Test Results: Whether FDI Granger-causes Aid  
 
Optimal number of lags (AIC): 7 (lags tested: 1 to 7) 
W-Bar 81.9327     
Z-Bar 90.0442 (p-value = 0.0000)    
Z-bar tilde 17.0882 (p-value = 0.0000)    
 
H0: FDI does not Granger-cause Aid. 
H1: FDI does Granger-cause Aid for at least one country in the panel. 
 
I interpret evidence that FDI Granger- causes United States government foreign aid to 
mean that technical advancement, knowledge transfer, and physical capital improvements 
attract aid, in part in the form of improvements in human capital, presumably. Kosack and 
Tobin (2006) show that aid significantly influences human development and human 
capital, and FDI impacts physical capital. Therefore, having the necessary technical 
assistance in place initially is important. If human capital improves without technical 
advancements and knowledge transfer, the marginal returns of improved human capital 
will be less than otherwise. Results from Table 8 support this reasoning.  
Additionally, Table 8 results could reflect the geostrategic dynamic of foreign aid. 
Garriga and Phillips (2014) and Wamboye et al. (2013) mention geostrategic aid does not 
help the country progress. However, non-geostrategic aid does. I mention in chapter 3 that 
United States aid could benefit the United States firms that rely on developing countries 
for production. That is, aid could effectively expand markets and deepen human capital, 
thus improving prospects for United States firms operating in countries that receive United 





 Furthermore, I reason that US government foreign aid follows FDI in the case of 
Sub-Saharan Africa because that region is important to the United States. In chapter 2, I 
mention that for national security concerns, business opportunities, and natural resources, 
Sub-Saharan Africa is important to the United States, independently of whether aid benefits 
the recipient countries. 
 In summary, the Granger-causality results that I report in Tables 8 and 9 imply 
bidirectional Granger causality between United States government foreign aid and FDI. 
These results are qualitatively like those that Thangami (2010) report for the case of 
Southeast Asia, for example. Finally, because the Granger-causality tests indicate an 
optimal lag length of 7 based on the Akaike Information Criterion, in Tables 10 and 11, I 
report panel regression results akin to those I report in Tables 6 and 7, though in this case 
I use a lag length of 7. Based on the 5-percent significance level, my results are 
substantively like those I report in Tables 6 and 7. 
Table 10. Panel Regression Results, FDI in First Differences as Dependent Variable  
FDI Coef Std Err t P>|t| 95% Conf Interval 
l_aid 0.4847203 0.4406004 1.10 0.283 -0.429029     1.39847 
l2_aid 0.9752847 0.3258908 2.99 0.007 0.299428    1.651141 
l3_aid 0.4829491 0.3278186 1.47 0.155 -0.196905    1.162803 
l4_aid 1.08822 0.5827738 1.87 0.075 -0.120379    2.296819 
l5_aid 0.74483 0.5435407 1.37 0.184 -0.382404    1.872064 
l6_aid -0.0507479 0.4932815 -0.10 0.919 -1.073751    .9722552 
l7_aid -0.0210876 0.4225025 -0.05 0.961 -0.8973042    .8551289 
_cons 7.33e+07 1.31e+08 0.56 0.583 -1.99e+08    3.46e+08 
Sigma U 4.574e+08 
Sigma e 9.790e+08 








Table 11. Panel Regression Results, Aid in First Differences as Dependent Variable 
Aid Coef Std Err t P>|t| 95% Conf Interval 
l_FDI 0.0222375 0.0090257 2.46 0.022 0.0035194    0.0409556 
l2_FDI 0.0132903 0.0063827 2.08 0.049 0.0000533    0.0265272 
l3_FDI 0.0337292 0.010292 3.28 0.003 0.0123849    0.0550735 
l4_FDI 0.0192407 0.0073514 2.62 0.016 0.0039948    0.0344866 
l5_FDI 0.0251857 0.0080571 3.13 0.005 0.0084764    0.041895 
l6_FDI 0.0082161 0.0077538 1.06 0.301 -0.0078644    0.0242965 
l7_FDI 0.0352074 0.0289537 1.22 0.237 -0.0248388    0.0952537 
_cons 6.74e+07 1.42e+07 4.76 0.000 3.80e+07    9.67e+07 
Sigma U    96705187 
Sigma e   1.273e+08 
rho   .36609051   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
 
5.3. Robustness Checks 
The unit-root test results that I report in section 5.2 are somewhat inconclusive. In that 
section, I presume the time series data in my panel regressions are stationary and I proceed 
accordingly. Here, I address the inconclusive nature of my unit-root tests. To do so, I take 
first differences of the time series (namely, United States government foreign aid and FDI), 
test for unit roots in these first-differenced data, and test for Granger-causality accordingly. 
Again, the unit root tests I perform are the Levin-Lin-Chu, the Harrais-Tzavalis, the 
Breitung, and the Fisher unit root tests. In each test, I reject the null hypothesis (based on 
a p-value of 0.00 in each case) that the panel contains unit roots and, thus, I conclude that 
the panel of first-differenced series is stationary.  
Next, I test my panel of first-differenced (and stationary) data for Granger-causality. In 
Tables 12 and 13, I report results. In Table 12, I report test results for the null hypothesis, 
United States government foreign aid does not Granger-cause FDI. I test this causal 
relationship with 7 lags of the hypothesized independent variable in this case, the first 





associated with the Z-bar test statistic is less than the significance level; therefore, I reject 
the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis: that is, United States government 
foreign aid does Granger-cause FDI in at least one country in the panel. 
Table 12. Granger Causality Test Results: Whether Aid Granger-Causes FDI, 
in First Differences  
 
Optimal number of Lags (AIC): 7 (lags tested: 1 to 7) 
W-Bar 17.0652     
Z-Bar 12.9010 (p-value = 0.0000)    
Z-bar tilde 1.3129 (p-value = 0.1892)    
 
H0: dAid does not Granger-cause dFDI. 
   H1: dAid does Granger-cause dFDI for at least one country in the panel. 
 
Table 13. Granger Causality Test Results: Whether FDI Granger-Causes Aid, in 
First Differences  
 
Optimal number of Lags (AIC): 7 (lags tested: 1 to 7) 
W-Bar 57.4732     
Z-Bar 64.6935 (p-value = 0.0000)    
Z-bar tilde 11.1398 (p-value = 0.0000)    
 
H0: dFDI does not Granger-cause dAid. 
H1: dFDI does Granger-cause dAid for at least one country in the panel. 
 
In Table 13, I report test results for the null hypothesis, FDI does not Granger-cause 
United States government foreign aid. Again, I test this causal relationship with 7 lags of 
the hypothesized independent variable in this case, the first difference of FDI, based on the 
Akaike Information Criterion. In this case, the p-value is less than the significance level; 





does Granger-cause United States government foreign aid in at least one country in the 
panel. 
 Finally, because the Granger-causality test indicates an optimal lag length of 7 
based on the Akaike Information Criterion, in Tables 14 and 15, I report panel regression 
results akin to those I report in Tables 10 and 11. Based on the 5-percent significance level, 
my results are substantively like those I report in Tables 10 and 11. 
 
Table 14. Panel Regression Results, FDI in First Differences as Dependent Variable 
dAid Coef Std Err t P>|t| 95% Conf Interval 
l_dFDI -0.0058402 0.0063162 -0.92 0.365 -0.0189392    0.0072589 
l2_dFDI 0.005613 0.0033453 1.68 0.108 -0.0013248    0.0125508 
l3_dFDI 0.0043677 0.0045887 0.95 0.352 -0.0051487    0.0138842 
l4_dFDI 0.0059155 0.0043667 1.35 0.189 -0.0031405   0.0149715 
l5_dFDI 0.0038594 0.0032276 1.20 0.245 -0.0028342    0.0105531 
l6_dFDI 0.0043149 0.005963 0.72 0.477 -0.0080516    0.0166813 
l7_dFDI 0.0198265 0.016914 1.17 0.254 -0.015251   0.0549039 
_cons 7617940 435899.5 17.48 0.000 6713940     8521941 
Sigma U 9771108 
Sigma e 1.012e+08 




Table 15. Panel Regression Results, Aid in First Differences as Dependent Variable   
dFDI Coef Std Err T P>|t| 95% Conf Interval 
l_daid -0.3203692 0.1856533 -1.73 0.098 -0.7053906   0.0646522 
l2_daid 0.4525449 0.2155658 2.10 0.047 0.0054889   0.8996009 
l3_daid 0.3127614 0.3222192 0.97 0.342 -0.3554804   0.9810033 
l4_daid 0.9947003 0.5735539 1.73 0.097 -0.1947777    2.184178 
l5_daid 0.9451505 0.5471751 1.73 0.098 -0.1896212    2.079922 
l6_daid 0.1287615 0.3636228 0.35 0.727 -0.6253459     0.882869 
l7_daid 0.2075158 0.2322174 0.89 0.381 -0.2740737    0.6891052 
_cons 1.07e+07 1.02e+07 1.04 0.308 -1.05e+07    3.19e+07 
Sigma U 69357802 
Sigma e 8.913e+08 







In this thesis, I test my central hypothesis that United States government foreign 
aid flows and FDI flows (from anywhere in the world) to Sub-Saharan Africa are 
intertemporally related; this is to say, I test the extent to which FDI flows follow—
and, thus, are caused by—aid flows or to what extent aid flows follow—and, thus, 
are caused by—FDI flows. Additionally, I argue why and test whether governance 
variables such as political stability, government effectiveness, and corruption control 
affect how much United States government foreign aid and or FDI a country attracts.   
My panel dataset of twenty-three Sub-Saharan countries spans 1991 to 2018. 
Based on the results of pooled-OLS and panel fixed-effects regressions, and panel 
Granger causality tests, I show that aid and FDI are intertemporally related, and that 
political stability, government effectiveness, and corruption control measures affect 
the inflow of aid and or FDI to countries in my sample. Additionally, Granger-
causality is bidirectional: FDI Granger-causes United States government foreign aid 
and this aid Granger-causes FDI. 
Perhaps most interestingly, evidence that FDI Granger-causes United States 
government foreign aid reveals a possible geostrategic motive behind the decisions 
of United States agencies to deploy aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. In principle, such 
motives include improving trade relations—and, thus, expanding export-market 
opportunities for United States firms—and strengthening national security. Given the 
strong evidence that I present indicating United States government aid and FDI are 
intertemporally related and given that FDI presumably generates returns for firms 





to deploy aid to Sub-Saharan Africa could be to advantage United States firms that 
direct FDI to the region. 
In any case, evidence of bidirectional intertemporal relationships between United 
States government foreign aid flows and FDI flows could inform policy makers intent 
on using aid or FDI as policy instruments to improve economic well-being in 
recipient countries, based on whether policy makers reason aid or FDI flows are 
beneficial. For example, considering my evidence that United States government 
foreign aid flows induce FDI flows, if policy makers reason FDI flows improve 
economic well-being in recipient countries, then policy makers should be aware of 
this intertemporal relationship when they decide how and where to deploy aid.  
Finally, the limitations of my study point to at least two important directions for 
future research. First, my panel regression specification in which I include FDI as the 
dependent variable and United States government foreign aid as the independent 
variable (of primary interest) likely suffers from an omitted-variable bias: for 
example, aid from outside the United States government—a variable I omit—may 
very well be correlated with FDI and United States government foreign aid; thus, my 
estimated coefficient on aid may be biased. An instrumental-variable approach is one 
way that future research might address this limitation. 
Second, I define aid in the aggregate—the sum of USAID-deployed foreign aid 
plus foreign aid deployed separately by other United States government agencies 
such as the Departments of Agriculture and Department of Health and Human 
Services, for example. Thus, I cannot identify the intertemporal relationships between 





agency level is one way that future research might address this limitation. 
Additionally, I only include twenty-three countries because I want to construct a 
balanced panel. Future studies can include more countries based on the availability 
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Burkina Faso 0.2719 
Burundi 0.0632 
Cabo Verde 0.0895 
Chad 0.3327 






























Appendix-2 Alphabetical listing of US Funding Agencies 
Data base contains support to various countries under following headings. support from 
following agencies is listed in alphabetical order. The funding data base is “US aid data”. 
This econometric analysis of USAID-Administered aid obligated. The data is taken from 
https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd 
 
African Development Foundation 
Agency for International Development, Capital Investment Fund 
Agency for International Development, Child Survival and Health Programs Fund 
Agency for International Development, Complex Crises Fund 
Agency for International Development, Development Assistance 
Agency for International Development, Development Assistance, Sub-Saharan Africa 
Agency for International Development, Development Credit Authority 
Agency for International Development, Gifts and Donations 
Agency for International Development, HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund 
Agency for International Development, International Assistance Program, Transition 
Initiatives 
Agency for International Development, International Disaster Assistance 
Agency for International Development, Office of Inspector General, Operating Expenses 
Agency for International Development, Operating Expenses 
Agency for International Development, Property Management Fund 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Agricultural Quarantine Inspection User Fee 
Account 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Salaries and Expenses 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Salaries and Expenses 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC Working Capital Fund 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Global Health 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, Sexually 
Transmitted Diseases and Tuberculosis Prevention 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Immunization and Respiratory Diseases 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Preparedness and Response 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Scientific Services 
Centers for Disease Control, Disease Control, Research, and Training 
Civilian Stabilization Initiative 
Commodity Credit Corporation Fund 
Department of State, Migration and Refugee Assistance 
Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Account 
Department of Defense, Defense Health Program 
Department of Defense, Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities 
Department of Defense, Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide 
Department of Defense, Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund 





Department of Energy, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, Border and 
Transportation Security 
Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Aviation 
Security 
Department of Justice, General Legal Activities 
Department of Labor, Departmental Management, Salaries and Expenses 
Department of State, Democracy Fund 
Department of State, Diplomatic and Consular Programs 
Department of State, Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, 
Department of State, Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance 
Department of State, Global Health Programs 
Department of State, Global HIV/AIDs Initiative 
Department of State, National Endowment for Democracy 
Department of the Air Force, Air Force Cadet Fund 
Department of the Army, Operations and Maintenance 
Department of the Navy, Operation and Maintenance 
Department of Transportation, Transportation Planning, Research, and Development 
Departmental Administration, Energy Programs, Energy 
Drug Enforcement Administration, Salaries and Expenses 
Economic Support Fund 
Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Programs and Management 
Environmental Protection Agency, Science and Technology 
Excess Defense Articles 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Salaries and Expenses 
Federal Trade Commission, Salaries and Expenses 
Food and Drug Administration 
Food Safety and Inspection Service 
Food Safety and Inspection Service 
Foreign Agricultural Service, Salaries and Expenses 
Foreign Military Financing Program 
Foreign National Employees Separation Liability Fund 
Gifts and Donations, Centers for Disease Control 
International Affairs Technical Assistance 
International Assistance Program, Working Capital Fund, 
International Military Education and Training 
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 
McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program Grants 
Military Assistance Programs (Old Code) 
Millennium Challenge Corporation, Expenses 
National Forest System, Forest Service 
National Institute of Food and Agriculture, Integrated Activities 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Operations, Research and Facilities 
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs 






Peace Keeping Operations 
Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund 
Public Law 480 Title I Direct Credit and Food for Progress Program Account 
Public Law 480 Title II Grants 
Sahel Development Program 
State and Private Forestry, Forest Service 
Sub-Saharan Africa Disaster Assistance 
Trade and Development Agency 
U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Contributed Funds 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Multinational Species Conservation Fund 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Resource Management 


















Appendix-3: Individual Country Wide Statistics (Aid and FDI) (In US $ millions) 
Angola      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 71.1 31.1 6.85 165 
FDI 28 -60.0109 3567.685 -7397.3 10028.22 
GDP 28 53500 50000 4440 146000 
G_eff 18 11.58006 3.812441 3.589744 17.22488 
C_con 18 5.679884 2.306732 1.522843 11.53846 
P_stb 18 27.20703 9.997511 1.587302 37.91469 
 
 
Benin      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 59.3 91.8 13.7 419 
FDI 28 116.9267 108.7352 1.405551 405.7373 
GDP 28 158 832 785 3170 
G_eff 18 36.70131 5.927274 25.96154 47.44898 
C_con 18 32.31339 5.845016 20.4878 41.34615 




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 49.1 92.4 9.154 504 
FDI 28 108.1104 148.2463 0.57 490.4034 
GDP 28 7120 4660 1900 16100 
G_eff 18 32.21749 3.679448 24.75728 38.34951 
C_con 18 48.49377 7.069122 36.49289 59.09091 




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 11.9 238 0.963 119 
FDI 28 81.24989 66.4961 .450472 209.2175 
GDP 28 1100 606 320 1970 
G_eff 18 76.85419 2.918055 70.2439 80.28846 
C_con 18 58.59019 4.116398 48.03922 65.64103 







Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 70.9 66.5 1.866 214 
FDI 28 186.7042 340.4556 -675.545 924.1192 
GDP 28 6190 4630 1180 13900 
G_eff 18 7.787425 6.035307 2.427185 25.64103 
C_con 18 4.874872 2.397414 1.456311 11.16751 




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 58.9 57.8 1.76 216 
FDI 28 350.2382 204.6087 18.52489 975.015 
GDP 28 22100 13900 8310 58000 
G_eff 18 15.66412 7.244814 7.177033 31.73077 
C_con 18 22.39591 11.84251 8.780488 42.30769 




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 5.92 5.02 1.9 19.1 
FDI 28 31.74732 23.54257 -27.7 82.20818 
GDP 28 1070 357 487 1670 
G_eff 18 29.24358 5.465048 18.75 37.94872 
C_con 18 31.94687 7.366658 21.63461 46.9697 




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 136 157 39.4 711 
FDI 28 1283.903 1445.196 20 3485.3 
GDP 28 23600 21000 4980 65600 
G_eff 18 51.92549 4.69467 43.75 60.4878 
C_con 18 53.1621 4.439397 43.90244 59.33014 









Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 43.9 32.0 16.0 184 
FDI 28 210.5575 356.901 0.21 1618.4 
GDP 28 5410 2560 2830 10900 
G_eff 18 13.81824 4.363924 6.829268 25 
C_con 18 14.66998 5.394581 6.796116 29.79798 




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 4.2 3.99 0.059 14.8 
FDI 28 10.90699 9.824944 .04 33.22383 
GDP 28 644 389 206 1460 
G_eff 18 9.218429 4.452095 2.884615 15.16588 
C_con 18 8.069186 4.097405 2.403846 14.14141 




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 414 402 17.7 1150 
FDI 28 490.7758 591.1178 2 1625.919 
GDP 28 30700 24200 57509 87800 
G_eff 18 35.64811 4.460791 28.92157 43.26923 
C_con 18 16.67825 2.628774 12.32228 21.46342 




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 33.2 68.3 2.03 364 
FDI 28 50.47651 47.24217 7.242913 206.5 
GDP 28 1560 694 704 2620 
G_eff 18 39.83651 11.94395 18.26923 55.61224 
C_con 18 58.33198 3.49397 53.53535 63.98104 











Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 133 131 285 580 
FDI 28 85.04819 115.0133 -28.7 509.6792 
GDP 28 4000 2809 1180 8000 
G_eff 18 31.22459 7.746767 21.95122 44.10257 
C_con 18 31.8472 7.959333 18.18182 47.20812 




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 207 175 53.1 751 
FDI 28 1308.413 1894.129 9.2 6175.125 
GDP 28 8710 4890 2590 17700 
G_eff 18 31.35982 7.864904 17.78846 43.36735 
C_con 18 32.51256 7.040584 17.78846 40.47619 




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 54.7 71.1 6.39 382 
FDI 28 362.7397 300.7017 19.60625 1060.807 
GDP 28 7320 3810 2990 13500 
G_eff 18 59.64745 2.692435 55.82524 64.79592 
C_con 18 65.64447 3.691565 60 73.78641 




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 72.8 11.3 4.48 581 
FDI 28 268.9572 353.266 -34.3513 1065.79 
GDP 28 5660 3510 194 12800 
G_eff 18 25.77942 4.793025 11.28205 31.10048 
C_con 18 26.49661 5.20183 15.65657 33.17535 










Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 268 274 2.31 853 
FDI 28 2187.993 2280.362 189.165 8649.53 
GDP 28 220000 176000 27800 547000 
G_eff 18 10.96082 4.520095 0.505050 19.41748 
C_con 18 14.67262 2.855347 8.61244 21.07843 




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 113 68.4 22.6 269 
FDI 28 114.8371 151.1592 .001 458.9 
GDP 28 4280 2930 754 9640 
G_eff 18 46.39046 14.44095 16.83673 64.90385 
C_con 18 58.79633 15.52106 31.70732 75.48077 




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 97.7 123 20.4 657 
FDI 28 214.5099 208.3392 -7.44398 847.8416 
GDP 28 12100 5860 4910 23200 
G_eff 18 43.42549 6.468632 34.44976 57.65306 
C_con 18 49.66724 9.737055 30.47619 61.61616 




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 39.1 40.0 8.01 210 
FDI 28 142.5424 229.8509 -7.46292 950.4783 
GDP 28 2090 1420 636 5020 
G_eff 18 9.501352 2.225416 4.102564 12.19512 
C_con 18 20.95049 5.59846 13.65854 37.01923 












Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 255 268 12.2 1010 
FDI 28 714.385 623.1645 .01 2087.3 
GDP 28 23600 17300 4260 58000 
G_eff 18 34.52945 6.718371 21.15385 42.85714 
C_con 18 33.84287 7.540339 22.74882 48.78049 




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 5.57 3.85 1.7 20.1 
FDI 28 68.48294 146.2086 -183.387 711.0875 
GDP 28 2670 1320 983 5360 
G_eff 18 7.40925 3.516076 2.926829 12.98077 
C_con 18 20.15471 4.652271 15.16588 28.36539 




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid 28 285 240 38.3 762 
FDI 28 405.796 381.903 -5.91 1205.388 
GDP 28 14800 11300 2860 32900 
G_eff 18 36.07516 4.245277 29.80769 43.84237 
C_con 18 18.50316 4.077831 12.98077 24.39024 
P_stb 18 16.7266 4.849727 6.532663 26.19048 
 
Aid: Current Aid; FDI: Foreign Direct Investment; GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
G_eff: Government Effectiveness; C_con: Corruption Contribution.  
P_stab: political Stability 
